



Justice4Yemen Pact  
ميثاق العدالة لليمن

REPORT

# Systematic Houthi property confiscations threaten livelihoods and sow the seeds of conflict

MARCH 2025



## Introduction

Since 2017 the Houthi de facto authorities have systematically confiscated the property of opponents including politicians, journalists, and activists.<sup>1</sup> Yemeni media and rights groups have extensively documented these confiscations alongside the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts on Yemen.<sup>i</sup> Property confiscations are an important source of funding for the de facto administration and are used to finance the war effort.<sup>ii</sup>

The de facto authorities have used various justifications to seize property. Houthi courts have frequently ordered asset seizures to accompany death sentences for charges related to aiding the enemy.<sup>iii</sup> Authorities have also seized property under the pretext that it belongs to the state, or

that it is needed for military operations, or that it was formerly consecrated as a religious endowment (*waqf*).<sup>iv</sup> In

one case profiled in this report, residents and shop owners in a western Sana'a neighborhood were informed their area was designated as a religious endowment in 14<sup>th</sup> century AD by a prince, and they would have to evacuate or start paying rent to the Houthi-run General Endowments Authority.

In 2021 the de facto authorities announced that ending property disputes was a priority, claiming that these conflicts burden the judiciary and security services.<sup>v</sup> However, authorities' systematic property confiscations have only sown the seeds of future conflict, as is clear from the outcry they have provoked from Houthi loyalists. These

### About Justice4Yemen Pact Coalition

The Justice4Yemen Pact is a coalition of human rights organizations and civil society actors that are united for the promotion and protection of human rights in Yemen. The coalition's mission is to advocate for the rights of all Yemeni people, particularly those who are most vulnerable and marginalized. The coalition is committed to addressing the systemic human rights violations that have plagued Yemen through years of conflict and violence. The Justice4Yemen Pact works to empower Yemeni people to claim their rights, raise awareness of violations, and advocate for justice and accountability at local, national, and international levels. The Justice4Yemen Pact is guided by the principles of respect for human dignity, equality, justice, and non-discrimination. The coalition believes that by working together, its members can end impunity, provide meaningful support and redress for victims, and contribute to a more peaceful, just, and prosperous future for Yemen.

### Acknowledgement

The Justice4Yemen Pact thanks SAM for Rights and Liberties for its work documenting property confiscations by the Houthi de facto authorities, which is featured in this report.

<sup>1</sup> While the de facto authorities began to confiscate opponents' property after taking over Sana'a in September 2014, confiscations became systematic in 2017. That year the authorities appointed a Judicial Custodian to oversee confiscations and created the Committee for the Containment and Seizure of Traitors' Property. In December 2017, then-head of the committee Abdul Hakeem al-Khaiwani issued orders for banks to freeze the accounts of 1,223 individuals affiliated with the internationally recognized government. See [al-Masdar Online](#) and the [Sana'a Center](#).

confiscations also threaten livelihoods and displace entire families for the alleged crimes of one of their members.

The current report focuses on property confiscations throughout 2024 that did not receive significant media attention outside of Yemen. It highlights how in recent years confiscations have targeted ordinary citizens and Houthi loyalists.

### Houthi leader Sinan Abu Isba' criticizes the judicial custodian, who spearheads property confiscations, in a Facebook post




Translation: "Netanyahu wouldn't do what the Judicial Custodian Saleh Dabish is doing. You raid homes filled with women and children, drag men to jail, throw the women and children in the street. Of course this is all documented, the families are still on the street .. any trash person who wants to comment and justify [this behavior], Dabish has my number, and I'm ready to face him in front of the prosecutor."<sup>vi</sup>

### Example #1 – The targeting of Sheikh Ali Rajih Tameem

On December 25, 2024, the head of the Committee for the Containment and Seizure of Traitors' Property<sup>2</sup> sent a request to a prosecutor in Sana'a regarding Ali Tameem, a tribal sheikh based in Amran governorate.<sup>vii</sup> The Houthi official wrote that the criminal court in Sana'a had frozen Tameem's assets because he stands accused of treason, and asked the prosecutor to direct all relevant authorities to seize Tameem's properties "for the public good."<sup>viii</sup>

According to information gathered by SAM for Rights and Liberties, Tameem's trouble with the de facto authorities began approximately two years ago. The authorities confiscated gas transport trucks owned by Tameem under the pretext that these trucks belonged to his business partner, the sheikh Mudhbeh al-Ahmar, who is affiliated with the internationally recognized government. Tameem tried to fight this confiscation in court in Sana'a. His legal saga concluded when the court declared him a traitor and ordered the confiscation of all his assets and property.

In January 2025, Tameem appeared at a gathering of his tribesmen to explain his predicament and ask for their support.<sup>ix</sup> At this



Above: Sheikh Ali Tameem explains his predicament at a tribal gathering. Source: Ali Nasr Dahman al-Ghazi, Facebook  
Right: The request from the head of the Confiscation Committee to the Sana'a prosecutor. Source: Sadeq Abu Shawareb, X (formerly Twitter)

<sup>2</sup> This committee is tasked with confiscating the property of politicians, members of the military, and others opposed to the Houthis. The Judicial Custodian Saleh Dabish heads the committee, as did his predecessor Saleh al-Shaer.

meeting, he said the judicial custodian had offered him 20% of the profit from his confiscated business operations as a settlement, which he refused. Tameem also signaled his ongoing allegiance to the Houthi cause by stressing that “the leader of the path, and the path and its principles, are innocent of these actions.”<sup>3</sup>

A former member of the Houthi High Revolutionary Council, Sadeq Abu Shawareb, came to Tameem’s defense in a series of impassioned social media posts. “The judicial custodian’s accusation that Sheikh Ali bin Ali Tameem is a traitor, while his patriotic position is well known to everyone, is a wretched attempt to confiscate his property and assets,” he wrote in one post.<sup>x</sup> “We swear to God and all the people that we declaim and refuse this action, and stand with the house of Tameem until they are given back their due and their money,” he wrote in another.<sup>xi</sup>

### Example #2 – The targeting of Taha al-Mamari

On September 24, 2024, the Specialized Criminal Court in Sana’a sentenced Taha al-Mamari to death by firing squad and ordered all his assets confiscated.<sup>xii</sup> This ruling was issued in absentia, as al-Mamari has lived in Egypt and Spain since 2015. In a Facebook post, al-Mamari explained that the September 2024 court ruling was only the latest in a yearslong series of violations targeting his property.<sup>xiii</sup>

Al-Mamari wrote that his predicament began on April 18, 2021, when a group of armed men raided two of his companies, Yemen Digital Media and Yemen Live, and confiscated the property within.<sup>xiv</sup> The men said they were acting under the authority of the judicial custodian, and cited a decision from the Specialized Criminal Court freezing al-Mamari’s assets under the pretext he was living in “countries of the Aggression,”<sup>4</sup> i.e., Egypt and Spain. In January 2024, the criminal prosecutor in Sana’a issued new charges against al-Mamari, accusing him of filming training camps and combat in Mareb, Taiz, and Aden, and distributing fake news. Al-Mamari noted that these charges could not possibly be true, as he had not visited Yemen since March 2015; nevertheless the court ruled he was guilty and ordered his execution.

Al-Mamari estimated the total value of his confiscated property at \$2,275,000.<sup>xv</sup> He wrote that in addition to the media equipment confiscated in April 2021, in late 2023 the de facto authorities took his satellite TV stations, house, land, cars, and other belongings.




<sup>3</sup> “The path” (*al-maseera*) refers to the Houthi doctrine and movement, while the “leader of the path” refers to Houthi leader Abdul Malek al-Houthi.

<sup>4</sup> The “Aggression” is Houthi shorthand for the Saudi-led Coalition allied with the internationally recognized Yemeni government.

### Example #3 – Ongoing confiscation of Ibb water project in defiance of court orders

In October 2021, a Houthi official confiscated a project that was supplying water to residents in and around the village of al-Nadhari, in Ibb governorate. Abdel Malek Mohammad al-Jahmi, a Houthi supervisor and representative of the judicial custodian, justified this move by claiming the water project was directed by the Charitable Society for Social Welfare (CSSW).<sup>xvi</sup> CSSW had previously been confiscated by Houthi authorities on charges of state crimes and aiding the enemy.<sup>xvii</sup> Residents countered that CSSW was merely a contractor working on the al-Nadhari water project.<sup>xviii</sup> Nevertheless, al-Jahmi took control of the project, raised rates, and began to pocket the revenues, according to residents who spoke to al-Masdar Online.<sup>xix</sup>



Bilal al-Qetwi. Source: Facebook.

Residents went to court to fight the confiscation and on May 17, 2023, the Specialized Criminal Court in the capital ruled in their favor, ordering the judicial custodian to return ownership of the water project to a local collective.<sup>xx</sup> Al-Jahmi ignored this order, as well as a follow-up order from the court.<sup>xxi</sup>

Residents brought their ongoing plight to the attention of Yemeni media outlets in June 2024. That same month Houthi loyalist poet, Bilal al-Qetwi, took aim at al-Jahmi in a fiery Facebook post.<sup>xxii</sup> Referring to al-Jahmi as a “corrupt, thuggish thief,” al-Qetwi wrote that the Houthi supervisor “is continuing to pilfer 1,000,000 riyals a month from the treasury of the al-Nadhari water project.”<sup>xxiii</sup>

Al-Qetwi demanded local authorities stop al-Jahmi from plundering the water project and compel him to return the other properties he had seized in Ibb to their rightful owners.<sup>5,xxiv</sup> Otherwise, al-Qetwi threatened to mobilize fellow Houthi soldiers and confront al-Jahmi by force. “I will gather together the true warriors who made great sacrifices on the fields of honor, to defend against and stop this lowlife, and force him to return all of the property in his thuggish hands, without any memos from the criminal court,” wrote al-Qetwi.

### Example #4 - Expropriation of homes and shops in a Sana’a neighborhood

In July 2024, residents of apartment buildings in Asr, west of Sana’a, received a “final warning” that they must pay back rent to the General Endowments Authority that owns their buildings or else be subject to legal action.<sup>xxv</sup> Many of the buildings’ residents are public sector employees whose salaries have not been paid since 2016.<sup>6</sup> Consequently, they have been unable to make rent since the General Endowments Authority raised their rents in 2020.<sup>xxvi</sup> These developments have been detailed in a series of solidarity statements signed by public intellectuals in Houthi-held areas, who called upon authorities to take the residents’ rent payments out of their unpaid salaries rather than resort to legal threats.<sup>xxvii</sup>

Inhabitants of the Asr Towers, as the apartment buildings are known, are not the only residents of Asr who have been threatened with expulsion by the General Endowments Authority. As early as January 2020, the Endowments Authority began to confiscate, and/or demand rent payments from, homeowners and storeowners in the area, under the pretext that their property was a religious endowment (*waqf*).<sup>7,xxviii</sup> Residents countered that they owned their homes and shops legally, in some cases having inherited them through the generations.<sup>xxix</sup>

The Ministry of the Interior released a documentary in March 2023 explaining the de facto authorities’ point of view.<sup>xxx</sup> A religious scholar explained that in the 14<sup>th</sup> century AD, a prince named al-Hassan ibn Hamza ibn Daoud designated western Sana’a, or modern day Asr, as a religious endowment. According to the scholar, the de facto

<sup>5</sup> Al-Jahmi has been [widely reported to confiscate](#) houses and other property in Ibb governorate.

<sup>6</sup> In mid-2016 the internationally recognized government based in Aden stopped civil service salary payments in Yemen. It resumed these payments in 2017 in areas under its control, but not in areas controlled by the de facto authorities. In Houthi territories, public sector employees have been paid irregularly, if at all, since that time.

<sup>7</sup> Under Islamic law, an individual can designate his property as a *waqf*, or religious endowment, which is used for a specific religious or charitable purpose. This designation lasts in perpetuity.

authorities had discovered historical documents proving this after taking over Sana'a in September 2014. The scholar cited several of these documents on camera, each of which had supposedly been authored hundreds of years ago.

In the same documentary, the head of the General Endowments Authority in Sana'a said that his office currently controls less than 10% of property designated as religious endowments across the country.<sup>xxxix</sup> He stressed that the General Endowments Authority, in coordination with the judiciary and security services, was recovering these properties from private owners.

### Example #5 - Confiscation of villagers' lands in al-Hudaydah

In May 2024 video footage surfaced of the de facto authorities expelling residents from the village of al-Daqawana in al-Hudaydah governorate. According to a local journalist following the case, the Houthis had been trying to compel al-Daqawana residents to abandon their farms for years.<sup>xxxix</sup> Authorities justified their actions by citing a ruling issued by Judge Taha al-Arjali of the Redressing Grievances Committee, although the text of this ruling has not been published.<sup>xxxix</sup> Some al-Daqawana residents who refused to evacuate were thrown into jail.<sup>xxxix</sup>

The expropriation of land in al-Daqawana was only the latest in a series of property confiscations targeting al-Hudaydah residents since 2020. The internationally-recognized Yemeni government, the UNSC Panel of Experts, and SAM for Rights and Liberties have all reported on extensive Houthi land grabs in al-Hudaydah under various pretexts—including the designation of these lands as religious endowments.<sup>xxxix</sup>

## Legal analysis

The arbitrary deprivation of property is a violation of relevant international human rights law.<sup>xxxix</sup> International humanitarian law prohibits the seizure of the property of an adversary “unless required by imperative military necessity” in non-international armed conflicts, a classification that includes the war in Yemen.<sup>xxxix</sup> The Statute of the International Criminal Court stipulates that in non-international conflicts, “destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict” constitutes a war crime.<sup>xxxix</sup>

Various sources have described the de facto authorities' property seizures, particularly those targeting perceived opponents, as unlawful and/or arbitrary. These include:

- **The United Nations Security Council's Panel of Experts on Yemen.** The Panel of Experts has detailed the de facto authorities' systematic confiscation of property in a series of reports and described these seizures as unlawful.<sup>xxxix</sup> In its latest report dated October 11, 2024, the Panel wrote, “the Houthis also continue to be involved in the widespread and unlawful use of armed personnel to freeze or confiscate assets of individuals and entities.”<sup>xl</sup> The report continued “the Houthis continue to systematically seize or confiscate private property without due process, in order to suppress dissent and finance war activities.”<sup>xl</sup>
- **The United Nations Security Council's Sanctions Committee.** The Committee sanctioned the Houthis' former judicial custodian, Saleh al-Shaer, in November 2021, in part for his “widespread and unlawful appropriation of assets and entities owned by private individuals under arrest by the Houthis or forced to take refuge outside of Yemen, in his capacity as ‘Judicial Custodian’ and in violation of international humanitarian law.”<sup>xli</sup>
- **The United States Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).** OFAC sanctioned then-Judicial Custodian al-Shaer in November 2021, writing that “Alshaer has overseen the Houthis' seizure of property in Yemen valued at greater than 100 million dollars, using a variety of unlawful tactics, including extortion.”<sup>xlii</sup>



- **The UN Human Rights Council's Group of Eminent Experts.** In a September 2020 report, the Group wrote, regarding the Specialized Criminal Court's sentencing to death of 35 members of parliament in absentia: "The charges appear to have been politically motivated...the convictions have been used to provide a veneer of legitimacy to the seizure of property of the defendants."<sup>xliv</sup>

In certain cases, the de facto authorities have proceeded with property confiscations despite judicial rulings issued by courts in their own territory ordering these confiscations be halted or reversed. In Example #3 above, the judicial custodian's representative disregarded repeated instructions from the Specialized Criminal Court in Sana'a to return ownership of a confiscated water project in Ibb to a local collective.

## Quantifying the scale of Houthi property confiscations

---

**In the absence of comprehensive estimates, the following figures indicate the scale and systemic nature of Houthi property confiscations:**

- **108 residences** were looted and seized by the de facto authorities during the first half of 2024, according to the UN Panel of Experts.<sup>xlv</sup>
  - **Approximately 550 judicial rulings**, containing death sentences paired with orders for asset confiscation, were handed down by Houthi courts from 2017 to September 2023, according to SAM for Rights and Liberties.<sup>xlvi</sup>
  - **3,000 court cases** involving the "recovery" of religious endowment land were active as of November 2022, according to the head of the General Endowments Authority.<sup>xlvii</sup>
  - **Over \$100 million** was the estimated value of property confiscated under the tenure of former Judicial Custodian Saleh al-Shaer, according to the US Treasury in November 2021.<sup>xlviii</sup>
  - **1,223 individuals** had their bank accounts frozen in December 2017, on orders of the then chief of the Committee for Containment and Seizure of Traitors' Property.<sup>xlix</sup>
- 

## Recommendations:

### To the Ansar Allah/Houthi Authorities:

- **Cease arbitrary property seizures:** Immediately halt the confiscation of private and communal property under political, military, religious, economic, or other pretexts.
- **Reinstate confiscated properties:** Return unlawfully seized assets to their rightful owners. Where restitution is not possible, provide fair and transparent compensation in accordance with international legal principles.

### To the UNSC Panel of Experts on Yemen, and the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen:

- **Increase monitoring and reporting:** Enhance UN investigations into unlawful confiscations and support Yemeni civil society organizations (CSOs) in documenting and reporting these violations.
- **Advocate for targeted sanctions:** Advocate for targeted sanctions against individuals and entities involved in systematic property expropriation.
- **Incorporate property rights into the peace process:** Given the widespread nature of property violations and their potential to generate future conflict, ensure that any future peace settlement in Yemen includes a clear framework for property restitution, compensation, and preventing future abuses.

## About the Yemen Human Rights Forensics Lab Plus (YHRFL+)

The goal of the Yemen Human Rights Forensics Lab Plus (YHRFL+) program is to increase recognition and protection of human rights in Yemen by empowering Yemeni civil society to champion justice and accountability through human rights documentation, reporting, and advocacy efforts. The YHRFL+ program is working to systematically document, preserve, corroborate, analyze, and report on evidence, obtained from a variety of sources, of human rights violations committed by all parties involved in the Yemeni conflict. Results of this analysis are summarized and presented in a series of investigative reports focusing on specific identified incidents of human rights violations. YHRFL+ also support efforts by Yemeni CSO partners to carry out strategic advocacy, community outreach, and victim and survivor engagement interventions locally and internationally.

## Contact

[Info@justice4yemenpact.org](mailto:Info@justice4yemenpact.org)

---

### <sup>i</sup> UNSC reports:

S/2024/731, October 11, 2024, summary, paragraphs 114-120, 137, Annexes 177, 181, 189; S/2023/833, November 2, 2023, paragraphs 28, 180-181, Annex 89; S/2023/130, 21 February 2023, paragraph 84, Annex 26; S/2022/50, January 26, 2021, paragraphs 78, 80-87, Annex 29; S/2021/79, January 25, 2021, paragraphs 97-102, Annex 27; S/2020/70, January 27, 2020, paragraphs 86-90, Annex 26; S/2018/68, January 26, 2018, paragraph 154 and Annex 56

### Select media reports:

"Confirming they have stopped production ... The Medicine Union denounces the Houthi storming, and confiscation, of two medicine production companies in Sana'a," al-Masdar Online, June 13, 2024, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/296576>; "A list of the properties of the sheikh al-Ahmar family confiscated by the Houthis," al-Harf 28 via al-Ayyam, November 16, 2024, <https://www.alayyam.info/news/A003JSV6-1MG3M7-5FA0>; "Confiscating opponents' assets under the guise of the Judicial Custodian," al-Mushahid, June 12, 2024, <https://almushahid.net/123689/>; "Wide condemnation of the Houthis' offering for sale the house of the former head of the journalists' syndicate years after confiscating it," Yemen Monitor, May 28, 2024, <https://www.yemenmonitor.com/Details/ArtMID/908/ArticleID/113572>

### Select rights groups' reports:

"The Houthi ruling to execute Taha al-Maamari and confiscate his money is systematic political and economic exploitation," SAM for Rights and Liberties, September 29, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/ytjcuejj>; "The Houthi group's freezing the assets of activist Khalid al-Anisi is a war crime and theft," SAM for Rights and Liberties, January 5, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/mwresd>; "Feudalism of the guardian, and the machinery of deception," SAM for Rights and Liberties, February 2022, <https://tinyurl.com/4xjmba28>

<sup>ii</sup> S/2024/731, October 11, 2024, paragraph 137; S/2020/70, January 27, 2020, paragraph 89

<sup>iii</sup> "In conjunction with the second anniversary of the execution of nine al-Hudaydah residents by the Houthi group - an extrajudicial execution," SAM for Rights and Liberties, September 18, 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/2jh3nzv3>; see also references in endnote i above

<sup>iv</sup> "Yemen is a 'waqf' for the Imam!," al-Masdar Online, 30 March 2023, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/271748>; see also references in note i above.

<sup>v</sup> "The spokesman for the High Committee of the Justice Organization, Colonel Najeeb al-Ansi, talks to the al-Masirah newspaper," al-Masirah News, February 21, 2021, <https://www.almasirahnews.com/61430/>

<sup>vi</sup> Post, Sinan Abu Isba'a, Facebook, May 13, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/44xh2zhh>

<sup>vii</sup> Post, Sadeq Abu Shawareb, X (formerly Twitter), January 5, 2025, <https://x.com/shwarboffice/status/1875894623044051425>

<sup>viii</sup> Ibid.

<sup>ix</sup> Post, Ali Nasser Dahman al-Ghazi, Facebook, January 8, 2025, <https://tinyurl.com/mr3r8pth>

<sup>x</sup> Post, Sadeq Abu Shawareb, X (formerly Twitter), January 5, 2025, <https://x.com/shwarboffice/status/1875893831578829206>

- 
- <sup>xi</sup> Post, Sadeq Abu Shawareb, X (formerly Twitter), January 5, 2025, <https://x.com/shwarboffice/status/1875894623044051425>
- <sup>xii</sup> “The Houthi ruling to execute Taha al-Maamari and confiscate his money is systematic political and economic exploitation,” SAM for Rights and Liberties
- <sup>xiii</sup> Post, Taha alMamary, Facebook, September 26, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/3empzxiuw>
- <sup>xiv</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xv</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xvi</sup> “Ibb...Houthi leader takes over a water project serving dozens of villages in Ba’adan Directorate,” al-Masdar Online, June 25, 2024, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/297234>
- <sup>xvii</sup> Feudalism of the guardian, and the machinery of deception,” SAM for Rights and Liberties, page 36
- <sup>xviii</sup> “Ibb...Houthi leader takes over a water project serving dozens of villages in Ba’adan Directorate,” al-Masdar Online
- <sup>xix</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xx</sup> Post, Bilal al-Qetwi, Facebook, June 24, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/bdcsp5av>
- <sup>xxi</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxii</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxiii</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxiv</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxv</sup> Post, Ahmed Nagi Albhaani, Facebook, July 24, 2024, <https://tinyurl.com/3cijhstj>
- <sup>xxvi</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxvii</sup> Ibid.; post, Ahmed Nagi Albhaani, Facebook, November 19, 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/ywn5bt9b>; post, Ahmed Nagi Albhaani, Facebook, August 13, 2020, <https://tinyurl.com/2zm9afs9>; post, Ahmed Nagi Albhaani, Facebook, June 23, 2023, <https://tinyurl.com/k4yzsxy2>
- <sup>xxviii</sup> “With a will from the worker of ‘al-Jawf’ from 800 years ago...the Houthi militia begins the largest campaign of land and property confiscations south and west of Sana’a, under the pretext it is the property of the Awqaf [authority],” al-Masdar Online, March 31, 2023, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/271814>; “The Awqaf office in the capital closes shops in the Aser towers for violating the use contract,” Saba.ye, January 25, 2020, <https://www.saba.ye/ar/news3085908.htm>
- <sup>xxix</sup> “With a will from the worker of “al-Jawf” from 800 years ago...the Houthi militia begins the largest campaign of land and property confiscations south and west of Sana’a, under the pretext it is the property of the Awqaf [authority],” al-Masdar Online
- <sup>xxx</sup> Post, General Endowments Authority – Amanat al-Asima, Facebook, March 12, 2023, <https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1212924559340912>
- <sup>xxxi</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxxii</sup> Post, Basem Ganani, X (formerly Twitter), May 5, 2024, [https://x.com/Basem\\_Ganani/status/1787182873918812516](https://x.com/Basem_Ganani/status/1787182873918812516)
- <sup>xxxiii</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxxiv</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>xxxv</sup> “Al-Iryani: The Houthi militia’s crimes against residents of al-Daqawana is an extension of acts of forced displacement against Tihama residents,” Saba New, May 7, 2024, <https://www.sabanew.net/story/ar/110517>; S/2023/130, February 21, 2023, Annex 26; “The Houthi group’s ongoing confiscation of lands and property belonging to citizens in al-Hudaydah is a crime against humanity that demands accountability,” SAM for Rights and Liberties, September 16, 2022, <https://tinyurl.com/3usa4tzk>
- <sup>xxxvi</sup> Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17; Arab Charter on Human Rights, Article 25
- <sup>xxxvii</sup> ICRC’s Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 50
- <sup>xxxviii</sup> Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 8.2.e.xii
- <sup>xxxix</sup> S/2024/731, October 11, 2024, summary, paragraphs 114, 137; S/2023/130, February 21, 2023, paragraph 84, Annex 26; S/2022/50, January 26, 2021, summary, paragraphs 80-82; S/2021/79, January 25, 2021, paragraph 97-102, Annex 27; S/2020/70, January 27, 2020, paragraphs 86-89, Annex 26
- <sup>xl</sup> S/2024/731, October 11, 2024, summary
- <sup>xli</sup> S/2024/731, October 11, 2024, paragraph 137



---

<sup>xlii</sup> “Saleh Mesfer Saleh al Shaer,” United Nations Security Council, <https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/content/saleh-mesfer-saleh-al-shaer>

<sup>xliii</sup> “Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Officer Overseeing Group’s Seizure of Opposition Property,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 18, 2021, <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0495>

<sup>xliiv</sup> A/HRC/45/CRP.7, September 29, 2020, paragraph 343

<sup>xlv</sup> S/2024/731, October 11, 2024, paragraph 137

<sup>xlvi</sup> “In conjunction with the second anniversary of the execution of nine al-Hudaydah residents by the Houthi group, an extrajudicial execution,” SAM for Rights and Liberties

<sup>xlvii</sup> “The head of the *Awqaf* General Authority to September 26: Among the most important of our strategic goals is recovering the confidence of the people in the *waqf* institution,” 26 September newspaper, November 13, 2022, <https://26sep.net/index.php/newspaper/26interview/47069-26-165>

<sup>xlviii</sup> Treasury Sanctions Senior Houthi Military Officer Overseeing Group’s Seizure of Opposition Property,” U.S. Department of the Treasury

<sup>xlix</sup> “The judiciary as a tool for the crime of burglary ... the campaign to take over rivals’ property in Sana’a continues,” al-Masdar Online, February 9, 2019, <https://almasdaronline.com/articles/164075>