Findings on Human Rights Violations against Journalists in Yemen

MARCH 2023

DT Institute
1500 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington VA 20009, USA
+ 1.202.800.6444

This report contains a combination of analyzed and raw data drawn from a variety of sources. Attributions of attacks made by third parties do not necessarily constitute attribution by DT Institute or its partner organizations. All findings are subject to change as new data are integrated into the analytical process and as new methods are applied to refine DT Institute’s understanding of the reported incidents.
About DT Institute

DT Institute is a U.S.-based non-profit international development organization acting as both an implementer and funder. As an implementing partner, DT Institute focuses on strengthening communities and leaders, working with local organizations, and developing new and innovative approaches. In its role as funder, DT Institute supports research activities and program implementation globally in the areas of stabilization, transition, and peacebuilding.

About the Yemen Human Rights Forensics Lab

The goal of DT Institute’s Yemen Human Rights Forensics Lab (YHRFL) program is to increase recognition and protection of human rights in Yemen by providing one-stop access to a comprehensive repository of digital evidence of human rights violations committed by all sides involved in the Yemeni conflict. The YHRFL program is working to collect, verify and preserve open-source digital evidence of human rights violations in cooperation with Mnemonic’s Yemeni Archive project and a coalition of local civil society organizations (CSOs) in Yemen. Results of the YHRFL’s analysis of this evidence in light of international human rights frameworks are summarized and presented in a series of analytical reports on themes such as the rights of journalists, the right to personal liberty and integrity, and the rights of children, as well as attacks against infrastructure objects and facilities critical to the survival of civilian population. The program also supports efforts of local CSO partners to carry out international awareness and advocacy activities aimed at promoting the use of documented evidence of human rights abuses for use in legal, reconciliation, and transitional justice and accountability processes.

Acknowledgements

DT Institute would like to recognize its partners Free Media Center for Investigative Journalism, SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties, and Studies and Economic Media Center, and their valuable work on documenting violations against the media, findings from which were incorporated into this report, as well as for facilitating interviews with journalists who have been victims of human rights violations. In addition, DT Institute would like to thank the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate for its cooperation in providing detailed data from its annual reports and for providing DT Institute with insights about media freedom trends in Yemen and individual violation cases. Finally, DT Institute would like to express its gratitude to the Yemeni journalists who agreed to be interviewed, whether under their own names or pseudonyms, to share their stories and discuss the ongoing challenges they face while doing their crucial work.
Contents

Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................................................1
Introduction ...............................................................................................................................................................3
  Methodology ..................................................................................................................................................4
Section One: Relevant International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law ...........................................6
  International Human Rights Law ...................................................................................................................6
  International Humanitarian Law .....................................................................................................................6
  Yemeni Laws Related to Freedom of Expression and the Press ..................................................................6
Section Two: Overall Violations Against Journalists ..........................................................................................7
  A Chill Over Sana’a .......................................................................................................................................8
  False Refuge .............................................................................................................................................. 10
  Aden: Home to Growing Press Crackdown ............................................................................................... 11
  Hadramout: Case Study in Government’s Disregard for Press Freedoms ............................................... 12
Section Three: Killings ......................................................................................................................................... 13
  Airstrikes, Mortars and Small Arms Fire ..................................................................................................... 14
  Unknown Assassins Target Journalists in Government Areas ................................................................ 15
Section Four: Arbitrary Detentions and Judicial Persecution ................................................................................. 17
  Torture and Other Mistreatment in Houthi Detention ................................................................................. 17
  Case of Mohammad al-Qadri: Mistreatment in Custody ............................................................................. 18
  Government Courts as an anti-Press Cudgel ............................................................................................. 19
  STC Levels Terrorism Charges Against Journalist Ahmed Maher ............................................................ 19
  The Case of Hala Badawi: Detention, Persecution, and Character Assassination ................................... 20
Section Five: Other Human Rights Violations ................................................................................................... 21
  Physical Assault .......................................................................................................................................... 21
  The Case of Abeer Abdullah and Colleagues: Attack by Security-Force Militants ................................. 22
  Threats and Incitement ............................................................................................................................... 22
  Shuttering and Commandeering Outlets .................................................................................................... 23
  Saba: Case Study in Commandeering Media Outlets ................................................................................ 24
Conclusion: Looking Forward ............................................................................................................................. 25
Appendix A: Background on YJS and their Data .............................................................................................. 27
  YJS Methodology ........................................................................................................................................ 27
  Why Use YJS Data? ................................................................................................................................... 27
  Caveats and Limitations ............................................................................................................................. 28
  Criticism of YJS .......................................................................................................................................... 28
Appendix B: Major Actors Included in This Report .......................................................................................... 29
End Notes ............................................................................................................................................................... 30
# List of Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoY</td>
<td>Government of Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Devices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RoYG</td>
<td>Republic of Yemen Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMC</td>
<td>Studies and Economic Media Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLC</td>
<td>Saudi-Led Coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Southern Transitional Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YHRFL</td>
<td>Yemen Human Rights Forensics Lab</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YJS</td>
<td>Yemeni Journalists Syndicate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive Summary

Since the onset of the Yemeni conflict in 2014-2015, actors affiliated with all major local parties have routinely targeted journalists and news outlets to silence dissenting voices and suppress unfavorable narratives. The severity of these violations varies considerably—from killing, to kidnapping, to threats and assault—but all incidents contribute to an environment where censorship and persecution suppress media activity in the country, with Yemen ranking 169 out of 180 on Reporters Without Borders’ Press Freedom index. This analytical report explores trends in violations against Yemeni journalists working in all forms of media: print, electronic, and radio. It aims to provide a foundation for efforts by international actors and the Yemeni civil society counterparts to achieve justice and accountability for these violations, including by pursuing legal action before various international human rights enforcement mechanisms and generating insights for advocacy campaigns.

The Houthi movement, officially called Ansar Allah, appears to be responsible for the majority and the most severe of the violations against the media, notably sentencing four journalists to death in 2020. The Houthis’ crackdown on the press that peaked after their takeover of Sana’a in late 2014 has cast a chill over media activity in Houthi-held territory. Hundreds of journalists have left the profession or fled, and the remainder either adhere to acceptable forms of speech or work in secret.

Areas under the control of the internationally recognized Republic of Yemen government (RoYG) and the Southern Transitional Council (STC) could have been a safe haven for journalists fleeing Houthi persecution. Instead, in recent years these areas have become home to a rising share of media violations. The concentration of journalists who fled from the Houthis in RoYG and STC-controlled territory has likely contributed to this trend. In addition, the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of human rights violations against journalists, and media freedoms more broadly, across Yemen has given a green light to actors in STC and RoYG-controlled areas to clamp down on journalists. Several recent events augur further deterioration in media freedoms in RoYG and STC-controlled areas:

- Assassinations carried out by unknown actors have killed four journalists – Nabeel al-Quaiti, Saber Numan al-Haidari, Fawwaz al-Wafi, and Rasha Abdullah al-Harazi – since 2020 and critically wounded a fifth (al-Harazi’s husband, Mohammad al-Atmi), suggesting that conflict parties are resorting to targeted killings to silence disfavored reporters.

- While RoYG-affiliated actors have long used the courts to harass journalists for their reporting and commentary, 2022 witnessed an escalation of this trend with at least two cases where authorities directed terrorism or espionage accusations at disfavored reporters, Hala Badawi and Ahmed Maher.

- In August 2022, the High Judicial Council approved the establishment of a prosecutor’s office for journalism, written publications, and electronic publishing, which coincided with a declaration by Chairman of the Presidential Council Rashad al-Alimi’s that criticism of the UAE and Saudi Arabia is off-limits.

Journalists are targeted for writing about sensitive topics such as political and military developments, for reporting on nuts-and-bolts issues such as service outages, and for opinion and commentary. These targeted attacks and threats reduce Yemeni citizens’ access to critical and basic information about the state of their country. In addition, intense politicization of Yemen’s media landscape means that journalists and media outlets sometimes themselves participate in threats and incitement campaigns against their fellow colleagues.
A sense of impunity characterizes human rights violations against journalists and the media across Yemen, with actors affiliated with conflict parties free to threaten, attack, and kill journalists seemingly without repercussions. A wave of international condemnation has not deterred the Houthis from ongoing persecution and mistreatment of journalists. In Aden, long-running police investigations of journalists’ murders have led nowhere. Indeed, the former governor of Hadramout, Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, was appointed as a member of Yemen’s new Presidential Council despite presiding over a wave of media repression during his five-year tenure.

Notwithstanding Yemen’s bleak and dangerous press landscape, some Yemeni journalists inside the country face these challenges head-on and continue to produce valuable reporting. Some rely on secrecy, for example writing under a pseudonym, to do so. Others use the protection afforded by their partisan loyalties to report on corruption and malfeasance. The continued work by these Yemeni journalists complements efforts by local and international human rights organizations to document and draw attention to human rights violations within Yemen. By publicizing the violations to which journalists are subjected, as is done in this report, the international human rights community can fairly depict the full panorama of violations and pave the way towards a more robust human rights landscape where reporters are free to carry out their essential work without fear of being targeted.

**Introduction**

The ouster of Yemen’s former president Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011 led to a brief period of optimism that the country’s repressive environment for the press would improve. During Saleh’s more than three decades of authoritarian rule journalists were routinely prosecuted by the courts, harassed, and detained. But hopes for a freer press were quickly dashed as Yemen descended into war following the Houthi takeover of Sana’a in late 2014, and the subsequent start of the SLC’s bombing campaign. Parties to the conflict co-opted or cracked down on journalists and media outlets as part of their war efforts. Journalists, who previously found themselves pressured and under attack from the government alone, now faced pressures and attacks from multiple directions.

As of November 2022, Yemen’s media landscape is heavily politicized, with conflict actors treating journalists more like combatants than civilians performing an essential public service. This is evidenced, in at least one case, with journalists having been released from detention as part of prisoner swaps among warring parties. In October 2020, an UN-brokered prisoner swap deal between the Houthis and government resulted in the release from Houthi detention of journalists Hisham Ahmed Tarmoom, Hisham Abdulmalik Al-Yousefi, Haitham Abdulrahman Al-Shihab, Essam Amin Balheeth and Hassan Abdullah Annab.

Yemen’s media grew increasingly polarized in 2015, with the bulk of functioning outlets becoming virtual mouthpieces for various sides in the ongoing civil war. Both the Hadi government and the Houthi rebels invested significant effort in their media operations, pushing nonpartisan writers and journalists to the margins of the information landscape, partly through dismissals and intimidation. Politicians and officials from each faction overwhelmingly privileged allied media in granting interviews and access.

— Freedom House

In addition to the typical dangers associated with wartime reporting—such as being injured or killed while embedded with military forces—Yemeni journalists contend with threats, assaults, detention, and even assassination by conflict actors disturbed by their coverage. In some instances, journalists and media outlets are themselves the driving force behind campaigns of incitement and harassment against fellow journalists from across the political divide.
The following graphic illustrates human rights violations against journalists during the current conflict, broken down by type, from January 2015 through December 2022.

**Violations Against Journalists by Type, 2015-2022 [1,492 Violations Total]**

- Killing (3)
- Detention (28)
- Threats and Incitement (11)
- Assault / Attempted Murder (18)
- Other (24)
- Trials (6)
- Stopping Salaries / Preventing Work (5)
- Torture (5)


This report provides a snapshot of the types of press freedom violations Yemeni journalists are exposed to on a regular basis. It is by no means a thorough accounting, as many incidents go unreported. Section 1 of this report discusses relevant international and Yemeni laws related to the media and freedom of expression. Section 2 covers overall violation trends. Sections 3, 4, and 5 discuss individual violation types in descending order of severity, starting with killings, then detention and ill-treatment, and finally physical assault, threats/incitement, and shuttering and commandeering outlets. Despite challenges with categorization and analysis posed by the sheer number and variety of press freedom violations in Yemen, each of these sections provides an overview of the relevant violation type over the course of the conflict, with an emphasis on cases occurring from 2021 onwards. The ultimate aim of this chronicling of egregious and recent incidents is to create a foundation for the local civil society and media community, as well as international human rights groups seeking to spearhead insightful advocacy campaigns aimed at putting into action a broad range of human rights enforcement, accountability, and redress mechanisms in an effort to move a step closer towards ending impunity and bringing justice to the Yemeni journalists who have faced persecution in connection with their professional work.

**Methodology**

The analysis and findings contained in this report are based on three main sources:

1) Data from the annual reports published by the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate (YJS) from 2015 through 2022, which was obtained, organized, and cleaned by DT Institute. The selection of YJS data as the starting point provides a holistic overview of the full range of violations journalists face in Yemen and, because it is based on direct reports from the victims, or their colleagues and family members, rather than news reports and social media posts, lends weight to the data’s evidentiary value.
On the other hand, a number of limitations were identified with regards to YJS data, namely the inconsistencies in the naming of violation categories and in the sub-categories across annual reports, as well as inconsistencies with counting of incidents with multiple victims as a single violation versus multiple violations. To address these limitations, DT Institute elected to only analyze the year-to-year YJS data for those violation categories that contained consistent sub-categories across annual reports, including killings, detentions, threats and incitement, and “physical assault.” DT Institute did not conduct year-to-year analysis on other violation categories that had significant variation or inconsistencies from one annual report to the next, such as firings and cutting off salaries, blocking access to websites or news stations, and attempted murder. In addition, rising or falling violation numbers were treated as rough indications of conflict trends to be confirmed or discounted by other data.¹

2) **Reports documenting human rights violations relating to the freedom of expression in Yemen** published by DT Institute’s three local civil society partners, Studies and Economic Media Center (SEMC), SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties, and Free Media Center for Investigative Journalism, as well as by international human rights organizations such as the Committee to Protect Journalists, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Reporters Without Borders.

3) **Interviews conducted by DT Institute with journalists currently working in Yemen.** Based on local news reports and input from YHRFL partner Free Media Center for Investigative Journalism, DT Institute compiled a list of 21 journalists who had been victims of violations after June 2021, which it then refined to six journalists to interview based on the following criteria:

   - Geographic distribution across Yemen in governorates under the control of different conflict parties;
   - Diverse range of human rights violations that the journalists were subjected to, including detention, threats and incitement, and assault;
   - Availability of each journalist’s contact information via one of YHRFL partner organizations.

The interviews were not structured to follow a specific template or questionnaire. Instead, interview questions focused on probing the circumstances of the violation each journalist had been subjected to, as well as their broader experience working as a journalist in Yemen. DT Institute explicitly asked for each journalist’s consent to having their names printed in this analytical report. Those who gave explicit consent are quoted by name, while those who requested anonymity are not named and are referred to by “they” pronouns to conceal their gender.

Drawing on these six interviews and the desk research, DT Institute selected a series of case studies to highlight in this report. These featured cases stem from recent violations that have occurred since 2021 and are representative of wider trends regarding violations against the press in Yemen.

It should be noted that this report complements the database of attacks against journalists and media infrastructure in Yemen published by YHRFL partner organization, Mnemonic, through its Yemeni Archive project.⁶ The Yemeni Archive database is a valuable tool for investigating incidents in which journalists were killed or wounded during the war. However, the Yemeni Archive database only includes highly visible, violent attacks against journalists and media infrastructure, such as airstrikes, mortar attacks, and small arms attacks. For some of these incidents, particularly airstrikes, it is unclear whether the journalist victims were the intended targets or unintentional casualties (see Section 3 for more detail). In addition, the Yemeni Archive database does not include other violation types such as detentions, threats, and assaults. For this reason, while DT Institute has referenced information from the Yemeni Archive database in producing this report, it has not structured its report around the Yemeni Archive data.

---

¹ A more detailed discussion of YJS and why their data was used for this report, as well as how DT Institute addressed limitations in the data is included in Appendix A.
Section One: Relevant International Human Rights Law and Humanitarian Law

International Human Rights Law

A September 2013 OHCHR report on journalists’ safety notes that “threats and attacks against journalists violate a wide range of human rights norms established in both treaty law and customary international law.” In particular, the protections enjoyed by journalists are specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Yemen is a state party. The attacks detailed in this report run afoul of many of these protections including: the right to life, right to liberty and security of person, the right to a fair trial, the right to equality before the law, the right to recognition before the law and rights to privacy, family, and home.

In addition, this report outlines how widespread threats and attacks against the press have cast a chill over media activity in Yemen. These threats and attacks therefore would appear to violate the individual and collective right to freedom of expression, also specified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The state is responsible for respecting and ensuring respect for the human rights of journalists and other media professionals. According to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, this “encompasses a positive duty of States to ensure that persons are protected from any act that would impair the enjoyment of their rights, including by taking effective measures or exercising due diligence to prevent any harm caused by private persons or entities. This obligation to protect is particularly important in the case of threats and attacks made against journalists by non-State actors[.]” The majority of violations detailed in this report are carried out by non-state actors. Given the impunity enjoyed by actors from all conflict parties when attacking, threatening, and jailing journalists, the Yemeni state would appear to be failing in its obligation to ensure respect for journalists’ human rights.

International Humanitarian Law

Journalists enjoy the same protections as civilians in conflict, meaning intentional attacks on journalists is a war crime. Journalists who directly participate in hostilities are exempted from these protections for the duration of their participation. Direct participation does not include common journalistic activities like conducting interviews, filming, or recording, nor does it include the dissemination of propaganda. This report highlights cases of journalists who were injured and killed in the course of their reporting and/or because of their reporting (see Killings subsection). This includes attacks in which journalists were deliberately targeted, which may therefore amount to war crimes.

Yemeni Laws Related to Freedom of Expression and the Press

Yemen’s 1990 Press and Publications Law appears to enshrine freedom of expression as an important civil right. However, the law contains various prohibitions punishable by a fine and up to a year in jail, including criticism of the head of state, and the publication of material the authorities view as liable to “spread a spirit of dissent and division among the people.” In addition, Yemen’s Criminal Code contains various prohibitions on speech including ridiculing Islam, punishable by up to five years in jail; insulting the president or state institutions, punishable by up to four years; and publishing “fake news,” punishable by a year. Under Saleh’s reign journalists were repeatedly arrested and prosecuted under these laws for writing critically about corruption, the judiciary, and advocating for political reforms. In 2009 Yemen’s authorities founded a Press and Publications Court following decision 120/2009 by the Supreme Judicial Council in order to prosecute journalists for violations related to articles 192-202 of the Criminal Code. Within two years the court had considered more than 100 cases.
Following the takeover of Sana’a in 2014, the Houthis have coopted the Press and Publications Court and continued to use it to jail journalists for alleged violations of the law. For example, in September 2019, the Court sentenced the head of the online search engine Sahafatak to a year in jail, time served, fined him an equivalent of $1,997, and shut down his search engine, based on a complaint brought by a private company that objected to an article the search engine had reposted.\textsuperscript{26}

The Houthis have also tried journalists on charges claimed to violate security provisions of the law. In addition, actors affiliated with the internationally recognized government have repeatedly detained and tried journalists for allegedly violating speech prohibitions specified in Yemen’s various laws as well as on security-related charges. In August 2022, the government’s High Judicial Council approved the establishment of a prosecutor’s office for journalism, written publications, and electronic publishing, raising the specter of a further crackdown on journalists in government areas for their work online. See Section Four for a discussion of cases in which the Houthis and government-affiliated actors have tried journalists in court.

Section Two:
Overall Violations Against Journalists

The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate (YJS) documented 1,492 violations against the press and press freedoms from 2015 until 2022. The severity of these violations varies considerably, from killing, to detention, to threats. All of these incidents contribute to a chilled environment in which censorship and persecution suppress media activity.

All major conflict parties have been responsible for violations against the press, with the Houthis registering the highest share in YJS data, as the figure below illustrates.

![Violations Against Journalists by Actor, 2015-2022 (1,492 Violations Total)](chart.png)

A Chill Over Sana'a

While the Houthis are responsible for the majority of all press violations recorded by YJS, after 2017, the number of violations attributed to them begins to decrease, as reflected by the graph below. This does not reflect a softening of the Houthis’ approach towards the press: in recent years they have committed grave violations including sentencing four reporters to death in Sana’a in 2020. Rather, the Houthis’ crackdown on freedom of expression that peaked after the takeover of Sana’a in late 2014, including raiding and shutting down outlets, threatening, arresting, beating, and torturing journalists, cast a chill over the media landscape. This led to hundreds of journalists leaving the profession or Houthi-held areas for their safety, with the remainder generally limiting their reporting to “acceptable” forms of speech.

“Walking through the streets of Sana’a, one invariably sees the latest car models, but struggles to find a recent edition of a book in any library. Books are no longer imported into Yemen...newspapers have almost completely disappeared; instead of the dozens of daily or weekly newspapers that were published in Sana’a prior to the Houthi takeover, there are only about five newspapers today — all of which are affiliated with the Houthis, and people are not keen to buy them. Print and electronic media in Yemen have been massacred, with journalists arrested, pursued, persecuted and left unemployed. Local radio and satellite channels have been directed toward supporting the Houthi war effort, with the exception of two radio stations that have survived by not addressing public affairs.”

– Commentary by a pseudonymous Sana’a resident published in April 2020 by Sana’a Center

With few exceptions, outlets that continue to operate in Houthi areas are either affiliated with the Houthis, or they are forced to publish propagandistic content alongside regular programming. Media outlets abiding by Houthi rules and regulations are still unsafe. A recent SEMC report documented nine radio stations that were stormed by Houthi-affiliated forces in the first half of 2022, despite the fact that the stations’ managers were reportedly trying to obtain official licenses and were broadcasting pro-Houthi content. These stations include the Voice of Yemen, whose broadcast was suspended in January 2022 by the Houthi Ministry of Information, leading to a six-month stoppage costing the channel 25,000,000 Yemeni Riyal ($99,899) in losses. After obtaining a decision half a year later from the Press Court in Sana’a allowing the resumption of their broadcast, the station was later stormed and looted by militants affiliated with the Ministry of Information and a local police department. “We were shocked by the assault, armed robbery and disrespect for the court’s decision,” the radio’s spokesman told SEMC.

“Just the suspicion of being a journalist can put you under threat,” said Justin Shilad, senior Middle East researcher with the Committee to Protect Journalists who has written extensively about press violations in Yemen. “We’ve had journalists tell us over the years that even to walk the streets of Sana’a with a camera is dangerous and it automatically invites a very aggressive response from Houthi forces,” Shilad told DT Institute.

Producing valuable, impartial journalism in these circumstances is extraordinarily challenging, but some intrepid reporters manage to do so at great personal risk. An investigative journalist based in Sana’a who has put together reports on human rights abuses, corruption, and environmental issues for international and regional outlets told DT Institute that discretion and secrecy are central to their approach. “I try to protect myself by covering sensitive issues under a pseudonym and also relying on my network of personal connections to facilitate my work. Also, I hide my identity as a journalist when I’m moving around the provinces, even on my passport I haven’t written I’m a journalist,” they said.

These precautions have worked, up to a point. The journalist said they have been detained on two occasions by different conflict parties. “I’ve also been threatened and warned on Facebook more than once to stop writing, by parties I don’t wish to name,” they added. “And there are a number of other dangers I face, the details of which I don’t want to talk about for security reasons.”

“Just the suspicion of being a journalist can put you under threat,” said Justin Shilad, senior Middle East researcher with the Committee to Protect Journalists who has written extensively about press violations in Yemen. “We’ve had journalists tell us over the years that even to walk the streets of Sana’a with a camera is dangerous and it automatically invites a very aggressive response from Houthi forces,” Shilad told DT Institute.

Producing valuable, impartial journalism in these circumstances is extraordinarily challenging, but some intrepid reporters manage to do so at great personal risk. An investigative journalist based in Sana’a who has put together reports on human rights abuses, corruption, and environmental issues for international and regional outlets told DT Institute that discretion and secrecy are central to their approach. “I try to protect myself by covering sensitive issues under a pseudonym and also relying on my network of personal connections to facilitate my work. Also, I hide my identity as a journalist when I’m moving around the provinces, even on my passport I haven’t written I’m a journalist,” they said.

These precautions have worked, up to a point. The journalist said they have been detained on two occasions by different conflict parties. “I’ve also been threatened and warned on Facebook more than once to stop writing, by parties I don’t wish to name,” they added. “And there are a number of other dangers I face, the details of which I don’t want to talk about for security reasons.”

“The reduction in the number of violations in Houthi areas is not considered an indicator that press freedom conditions are improving in those areas, but an indication of the dangerous situation that does not allow journalists to practice their work, to the degree that journalism has become semi-stopped.”

– YJS first half of 2022 report
False Refuge

As mentioned above, areas under internationally recognized government control could have been a refuge for journalists fleeing persecution by Houthi authorities. But in recent years government and STC-held areas have instead become home to a rising share of press freedom violations. In the last year alone, authorities in Hadramout and Taizz prosecuted at least three journalists for publishing content critical of state institutions or officials. They silenced a fourth by arresting her and accusing her of aiding terrorists. In Aden, a series of car bombs planted by unknown assailants killed and maimed six journalists including an expectant mother who was reportedly on the way to the hospital at the time of her killing.

A 2018 SEMC report found that of 254 journalists surveyed across Yemen who had fled their homes since the war began, the vast majority (86%) left Houthi-held Sana’a. Overall, 70% percent of journalists who fled went abroad, while the remaining 30% headed for government-held areas: of these 30% went to Aden, 28% to Taizz, and 16% to Mareb. The resulting concentration of journalists in these areas has likely driven the rising share of overall press violations committed by actors affiliated with the government and STC. Since 2017 actors affiliated with the government have averaged 49 press violations a year, even surpassing the Houthis’ share of violations in 2019 (who averaged 123 per year) according to YJS data. YJS data also shows that the share of violations committed by STC-affiliated actors has been rising since 2018, as reflected in the graph below, with the exception of 2022, during which the STC’s share of violations dropped to 7%, for unclear reasons.

Aden: Home to Growing Press Crackdown

Recent history in Aden offers another sobering predictor for the future of journalism in areas under government control. There, the power struggle between the separatist STC and other government actors including the Islah party has cast a long shadow over press freedoms. Actors affiliated with the STC have commandeered official press outlets and cracked down on disfavored journalists, part of a push to assert control over the seat of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

Violations against journalists by actors affiliated with the southern separatist forces—including detentions and threats—have been ongoing since 2016 as documented by YJS, although at a lower rate (eight per year from 2016-2021) than the government and Houthis. In one notable 2018 incident, militants wearing “Security Belt” uniforms stormed the office of the al-Shomou foundation that was used to print the al-Shomou and Akhbar al-Youm papers, setting the office ablaze and abducting seven employees. In 2019, militants commandeered the government-affiliated October 14 paper and turned it into a pro-STC outlet, reportedly prompting the government to stop paying the paper’s operating expenses.

On May 2 2021—one day prior to World Press Freedom Day—the governor of Aden issued instructions requiring media outlets to apply for new work permits through the local media office, effectively cancelling previous permits issued by the internationally recognized government’s media ministry. The announcement of the changes emphasized to press workers the importance of receiving new licenses “so you aren’t subject to administrative and judicial measures including work stoppages and payment of monetary fines, in coordination with security forces.” Shortly thereafter a group of STC-affiliated militants raided and commandeered the office of the government’s Saba News Agency.

Local authorities have reportedly circulated to broadcasting stations the names of journalists prohibited from appearing on TV. Fuad Musid, a journalist who has published with a number of local and regional outlets, spoke to DT Institute about the night in September 2022 when he learned he was on such a list:

“The coordinator for BBC Arabic contacted me and we agreed that I would participate in a TV interview to comment on news related to clashes with al-Qaida in Abyan in southern Yemen. The interview was scheduled for 8:00pm local time. I arrived at the broadcast office of Yemen Live—a private company—shortly before the interview time. The office coordinator asked me to wait a little. He left and made a phone call—I don’t know to whom or what the call was about—but after he finished, he returned and apologized to me, saying ‘sorry but we can’t broadcast the interview, because you’re one of those people prohibited from running interviews.’ I asked him who issued this decision, and he said that [an] official for the Southern Media National Bureau informed him of it. He apologized once more on behalf of his office and said I wasn’t the only one—that there’s a list containing a group of names prohibited [from giving TV interviews].”

Finally, militants affiliated with the STC’s Security Belt Forces stormed YJS’ Aden office on September 20, 2022. After YJS contacted Aden’s governor, who in turn talked with the governorate’s ranking security official and a local police department, the militants left the building later that day, according to a YJS announcement.
Recent events do not bode well for the future of press freedoms in both the government and STC-held territory. In August 2022, the RoYG’s High Judicial Council approved the creation of a prosecutor’s office for journalism, printed materials, and electronic publishing.44 “There is a small degree of freedom available on social media. But people fear for this margin of freedom following the formation of a prosecutor’s office for electronic publishing, which means that social media will become subject to monitoring just like regular media,” said a journalist in Aden who wished to remain anonymous. Given government actors’ wartime record of using the courts to prosecute and harass journalists (see Section Four), this journalist’s fears are not unfounded.

“It’s clear that when the new presidential council began its work, it thought about how to restrict press freedoms,” said Nabeel al-Saidi, head of YJS’ Training Committee. He was referring to the internationally recognized government’s presidential council that was ceded the reins of power by former president Hadi in April. In addition to the government’s decision to establish a new prosecutor’s office that includes electronic publishing under its remit, the head of the presidential council Rashad al-Alimi emphasized during an August 2022 meeting with parliamentary leadership that it was “not permissible to insult or target our brothers in the coalition under the leadership of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which deserve all praise and high esteem and appreciation of their sacrifices and their brave, brotherly stances.”45

This statement from Yemen’s nominal leader—that criticism of Saudi Arabia and the UAE is off-limits—is “a dangerous indication we understand to mean that the coming phase will be one of silencing people, of losing press freedoms in the governorates under the control of the government and STC,” said YJS’ al-Saidi.

Hadramout: Case Study in Government’s Disregard for Press Freedoms

The five-year tenure of Hadramout’s recently dismissed governor, Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, was rife with freedom-of-the-press violations.46 The former governor’s stance towards the press is exemplified by an incident in 2020 in which he reportedly ordered the arrest of photographer Abdullah Bukeir for sharing a photo of a box of a tissues with his face printed on them, which had elicited satirical responses on social media.47 Bukeir was held for nearly a year in detention, during which he went on hunger strike and was hospitalized. Under the governorship of al-Bahsani, Hadramout’s military intelligence services and courts repeatedly detained and tried journalists because of their reporting and commentary. Three journalists who had fled the province received death threats from a local military official.

Al-Bahsani’s replacement, Makhbout Bin Madi, has promised a to turn a new page with the press. 48 But his brief record has been mixed with respect to press freedoms. Journalist Sabri bin Makhshin, who fled Hadramout for Cairo after a stint in detention because of his writing, and whom Hadramout authorities have tried to repatriate via Interpol, was summoned under the new governor’s watch for a fresh round of interrogation, according to al-Saidi. On the other hand, criminal charges against journalist Hala Badawi were dropped by the First Criminal Court of Hadramout in December 2022, according to Badawi’s defense lawyer, representing a rare case in Yemen of a journalist being publicly cleared of trumped-up charges.49

Nevertheless, former governor al-Bahsani was appointed one of eight members of the government’s presidential council in April. His inclusion on the council, taken together with al-Alimi’s statements on the impermissibility of criticism directed at Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and the formation of a prosecutor’s office for journalism, printed materials and electronic publishing, signal that further erosion of press freedoms is likely in areas under government control.
Section Three: Killings

YJS documented 44 press workers killed in Yemen from 2015-2022. The nature of these killings varies widely. Some cases involve individuals being killed while embedded with military forces; others include journalists killed while at home or the office. Killings from 2015 to 2020 were predominantly carried out by the SLC or Houthis, and involved airstrikes, mortar/missile attacks, and small arms fire. In 2021 and 2022, a wave of car bomb attacks concentrated in Aden killed five journalists, which were carried out by unknown perpetrators, as illustrated in the graph below.

Killings 2015-2022, by Perpetrator

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Houthis</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Saudi-led coalition</th>
<th>Extremist groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Yemeni Journalists Syndicate annual reports 2015-2021, and first half of 2022 report. Two cases in 2015 attributed to the Houthis include Abdul Qabel, correspondent for Yemen Shabab, and Yusuf al-Azari, correspondent for al-Suhail. They included them as Houthis-perpetrated violations.
Airstrikes, Mortars, and Small Arms Fire

While the SLC is listed as the perpetrator in less than 3% of total violations recorded by YJS, 30% of the most severe violation type, killing, is attributed to the coalition. All the killings in the YJS dataset for which the SLC is listed as responsible occurred from 2015-2018, and all were airstrikes. “The Saudi-led Coalition’s use of larger impact airstrikes...makes for a more difficult analysis of whether individuals were specifically targeted, were merely caught up in military crossfire, or were killed on a blurred boundary between the frontline and civilian areas,” writes the Yemeni Archive in the introduction to its 2021 database of attacks against the press in Yemen.50

Two examples help illustrate this ambiguity. A 2015 airstrike reportedly carried out by the SLC on an arms depot located at the Jabal Faj Attan military camp southwest of Sana’a caused a massive blast, damaging cars and shops up to four kilometers away with flying shrapnel and munitions.51 The Yemen Today TV station, located around 1,200 meters from the camp, was damaged in the blast, killing four employees and injuring fifteen more. Another airstrike in 2018 on a farm belonging to former president Ali Abdullah Saleh killed two members of a crew for Yemen TV who were filming a Ramadan TV special. Houthi military vehicles including two tanks were also present at the location of the strike, according to an anonymous local security official and an activist quoted by Agence France-Presse.52

A spokesman for the SLC said during a March 2015 press conference that media outlets aligned with the Houthis and former president Saleh were “among the coalition’s targets.”53 Several airstrikes attributed to the coalition by media reports have directly hit media infrastructure or press workers, including one strike in 2016 that destroyed the house of the Yemen TV director Munir al-Hakimi and his wife Suad al-Hajira, killing both as well as three of their children.54

In contrast to attacks attributed to the SLC, the Houthis have tended to kill media workers with small arms fire, mortars, rockets, and in at least one case, torture. By nature, many of these attacks appear deliberate and targeted, particularly those involving small arms. For example, in February 2016 photographer Ahmed al-Shaibani was shot in the head in Taizz by a sniper reportedly belonging to Houthi and pro-Salih forces, as he was reporting on clashes for Yemen TV and Yaman News.55 In video footage showing the moment of al-Shaibani’s death, he runs across a city street wearing business casual attire and carrying a handbag, following a group of two women and one man also wearing civilian clothing. No one in the group appears to be carrying weapons. After al-Shaibani is shot, as two men attempt to evacuate him from the street, they are also fired upon.
Unknown Assassins Target Journalists in Government Areas

From 2019 onwards the share of killings attributed by YJS to the SLC and the Houthis has decreased, as shown by the graph at the beginning of this section. Instead, unknown actors have become responsible for all but one killing documented by YJS in 2020, 2021, and 2022, relying mainly on car bombs to carry out their attacks, in addition to one case of small arms fire and one case where knives were employed.

This appears to represent a trend whereby conflict parties are eliminating disfavored journalists with targeted assassinations. The unidentified nature of the perpetrators reflects the chaos and absence of the rule of law that characterizes areas under control of the internationally recognized government and the STC, with police investigations leading nowhere.

The majority of these attacks have occurred in Aden, the nominal capital of RoYG that is under the de facto control of the STC. In June 2020, unidentified assailants gunned down freelance reporter and photographer Nabeel al-Quaiti in front of his home in Aden. Al-Quaiti had recently embedded with the STC in its fight against Yemeni government and Islah-aligned forces, leading to speculation that the latter two parties may have been behind his murder. But all three actors—the STC, government and Islah party—condemned his killing. Complicating matters, the STC and government laid competing claims to his murder investigation, which has produced no concrete results two years since his death.

source: Yemeni Journalists Syndicate annual reports 2015-2021, and first half of 2022 report. Two cases in 2015 attributed to the Houthis include Abdul Qabel, correspondent for Yemen Shabab, and Yusuf al-Azari, correspondent for al-Suhail. They included them as Houthis-perpetrated violations.
In November 2021 journalist Rasha Abdullah al-Harazi and her husband Mahmoud al-Atmi were driving when their car was blown up by an explosive device. They reportedly were on the way to the hospital for a medical visit related to Al-Harazi’s pregnancy. Al-Hazari was killed in the attack, while al-Atmi was severely wounded but survived.\(^58\) Al-Atmi told The National from his hospital bed that the Houthis were behind the assassination attempt. He had previously learned they were searching for his home address in Aden, his type of car, and his movements, although the Houthis denied any involvement.\(^59\)

The attack on Al-Harazi and Al-Atmi came one month after another car bomb detonated in Aden as a convoy passed by that included the governor and the minister of fishing.\(^60\) Several people were killed in the blast including three journalists accompanying the convoy: Ahmed Abu Saleh, Tareq Mustafa, and Ahmed Ba Ras. However, the attack appeared to have targeted the governor, who survived, rather than the three journalists who did not.\(^61\)

Most recently, in June 2022, a bomb planted in journalist Saber Numan al-Haidari’s car exploded as he was driving through the Kabota area of Aden, killing him.\(^62\) Al-Haidari had left the capital Sana’a in 2017 due to the restrictive press environment in Houthi-held areas. At the time of his death, he was working as a reporter for the Japanese TV station NHK. Furthermore, Saber’s sister Nabila was subject to a wave of lewd and threatening messages when she posted an announcement of her brother’s funeral.\(^63\)

Aden is not the only site of recent assassinations carried out by unidentified individuals. Journalist Fawwaz al-Wafi was stabbed to death in March 2022 under murky circumstances as he sat in his car in government-held Taizz. His lawyer spoke to SEMC and said the investigation into his death is proceeding albeit slowly, with three of five suspected perpetrators arrested, one of whom was later released. Their identity has not been made public.\(^64\)

---

**Near-Fatal Attacks**

In addition to 44 killings from 2015 through 2022, YJS has documented 80 cases of what it terms “attempted murder” in the same period. Some of these cases involve journalists being wounded while covering battles; others represent unsuccessful assassination attempts. 2017 witnessed the highest share of these attacks, with YJS documenting 29 incidents that year. Notable examples from that year included:

- Kamel al-Khoudhani, whom militants attempted to gun down as he left the Journalism and Publishing Court in Sana’a.
- Waleed al-Qudsi, who was injured by a mortar reportedly fired by Houthi militants as he was covering clashes in Taizz, and whose leg was later amputated.
- Fawwaz al-Wafi, who was shot in the face by a Houthi sniper in Taizz, shattering his jaw. Al-Wafi survived only to be stabbed to death earlier this year in Taizz.
Section Four: Arbitrary Detentions and Judicial Persecution

Detaining journalists for their reporting and commentary is a common practice carried out by all of Yemen’s major conflict parties. Detentions, kidnappings, and forced disappearances make up 28% of the 1,492 violations recorded by YJS since 2015. Some journalists are released days, weeks, or months after their detention; others are held for years in deplorable conditions. In line with overall trends in violations (see Section Two), the Houthis’ share of arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances has decreased since 2017, while the government’s share has increased, as shown by the graph below.

![Graph showing detentions and disappearances, 2015-2022](image)

**Detentions and Disappearances, 2015-2022**


Torture and Other Mistreatment in Houthi Detention

The Houthis were responsible for the majority (58%) of detentions and forced disappearances carried out against journalists 2015-2022, according to YJS data. While in Houthi detention many journalists have been subjected to mistreatment and torture, including beatings, electric shocks, solitary confinement, and deprivation of food, water, medical treatment, and access to a toilet. As of November 2022, at least nine journalists remain in Houthi custody years after their initial detention, including four who have been on death row since 2020. YHRFL local partner CSOs Free Media Center for Investigative Journalism, SAM, and SEMC have raised awareness around the plight of these four journalists and advocated for their release.

Tawfiq al-Mansouri is one of these four journalists sentenced to die by the Houthis. Tawfiq’s brother told SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties in July 2022 that he suffers from various maladies on death row, including diabetes, trouble breathing, heart problems, enlargement of his prostate, and swelling in his feet and face. His brother said that these symptoms appear to be the early indications of kidney failure due to the torture Tawfiq endured during his seven-year stint in prison. A July 2022 announcement in the name of Tawfiq’s family, shared by his brother on Twitter, says that the prison warden had threatened Tawfiq and his colleagues with “a slow death” and that the warden’s “insistence on depriving him of medical treatment means carrying through on that threat.” In August 2022, Tawfiq’s skull was split open during a torture session, according to a December 2022 announcement by family members of the journalists on death row.
Case of Mohammad al-Qadri: Mistreatment in Custody

Mohammad al-Qadri tells a similar story of mistreatment and torture while in Houthi custody. Since 2015 al-Qadri has written opinion and commentary for government-affiliated news websites including Aden al-Ghad, Bawabati, and al-Mashad al-Yemeni, as well as the Saudi al-Watan. He was arrested by Houthi forces in Ibb governorate last year and held for a year in prison during which his health severely declined. He spoke to DT Institute about his time in detention:

“I was arrested most recently on May 13, 2021, when Houthi militia members wearing masks ... raided my home and terrified my family. One of them opened my phone, showed me some of my online articles and said, ‘are those yours,’ and I said ‘yes,’ at which point they tied my hands behind my back and covered my eyes, hit me, and led me to a hidden prison that belongs to the Houthi security and intelligence services.

As for the charges leveled against me, they considered my work incitement. That I'm writing against them. Also, I was in communication with the Panel of Punishment [i.e., the Panel of Experts on Yemen] at the security council, about the crimes the Houthis were committing in Ibb. They called this an intelligence monitoring and gathering operation. They labeled me an intelligence asset for the security council. Also they labeled me as a journalist—the accusation was that I was inciting [the people] against them.

In prison I was exposed to all types of physical and psychological torture. Torture with electricity, beatings, restraints, sometimes they would tie my hands behind me and put something heavy on top, then make me stand, sit, stand, sit, until I got dizzy. They would pour water on us and then shock us with electricity to increase the pain. They sometimes tied our hands and hung us from above, and punished us with various punishments. I was imprisoned in a solitary cell two by one meters underground, no light.

Until today I can’t bend some of my fingers because of the intensity of the torture. My eyesight is poor because of how often I was exposed to light shock. I had urinary tract infections and my kidney was impacted, I couldn’t urinate. They didn’t give us any medical treatment. They don’t treat anyone without money. You can pay large sums for treatment but I had no money or visits to pay for treatment.

They released me from prison after my health greatly deteriorated. I was expected to die in prison. They wanted to release me to not have responsibility for that. Also, there were big interventions by third parties [advocating for my release] and the payment of large sums of money. They released me after having my family pledge that I wouldn’t return to journalistic writing, and that I stay at home under house arrest, under intense scrutiny. And that I go to the security and intelligence every month and sign a document that I was present.

I left prison on May 6, 2022. And I spent three months under house arrest until I was able to flee at night, around a month and a half ago, where I reached al-Dhalea. And I’m there now, in bad health. The one good thing now is I’m safe, although my health and financial situation are awful.”
Government Courts as an Anti-Press Cudgel

Neither government nor STC actors have yet issued death sentences against the press like the Houthi movement. However, as with detentions carried out by the Houthis, arrests of journalists conducted by government actors are often paired with judicial proceedings including bringing criminal charges such as “insulting a public official” or “disturbing the peace.”

YJS documented 15 journalists subject to judicial persecution during 2022, among them 11 cases in which the perpetrator was affiliated with RoyG. These cases include Ubeid Saeed Waked, arrested by security services in Mukalla on the basis of articles he had written criticizing the Yemeni oil company in Hadramout, and whose case is pending before a local court. Another case involves Jameel al-Samit in Taizz, who was sentenced to a year in prison (suspended sentence) and a 270,000 Riyal fine by a local court in May 2022. Al-Samit published a copy of the Taizz court’s decision on Facebook, in which his charges are summarized as “making fun of some army leaders and former [military] district leaders in his posts on Facebook.”

STC Levels Terrorism Charges Against Journalist Ahmed Maher

Ahmed Maher is a journalist who is highly critical of the STC in his reporting and commentary. During the war he fled Aden for Taizz after receiving threats from STC-affiliated actors, only to return to Aden following the creation of Yemen’s Presidential Council in April 2022. On August 6, STC-affiliated security forces raided his home and arrested him and his brother, moving them to several locations, the last of which was the Bir Ahmed military camp prison.

In late August a clip circulated on social media websites showing Ahmed Maher confessing to helping militants carry out assassination operations targeting leaders within the STC. “Sources have informed me that he was exposed to severe torture in order to issue [these] strange confessions,” YJS’ Nabeel al-Saidi said in a September 7 interview with al-Hadath. Ahmed’s older brother Mayyas was reportedly released from prison in October, but Ahmed remains in detention. The severity of the charges levelled against Ahmed Maher serves as a message to journalists working in the south that criticism of the ruling STC carries serious and potentially life-threatening consequences.
Authorities in Hadramout have used the courts to pursue journalists Sabri bin Makhasin and Awwad Kashmim on charges of “disturbing the peace” and “harming military operations,” on the basis of their critical writings, according to YJS. Finally, actors affiliated with the government and STC have levelled terrorism and espionage-related accusations against at least two journalists in the past year, Ahmed Maher and Hala Badawi.

The Case of Hala Badawi: Detention, Persecution, and Character Assassination

Hala Badawi is a journalist and activist in Hadramout governorate. She posted a mix of reporting and commentary, including on public services outages and corruption, on Facebook as well as news websites like Aden al-Ghad.

On December 29 Badawi posted on Facebook that a close colleague called and asked her to stop criticizing Jamal Abdoun, then director of education on the Hadramout coast and a frequent target of Badawi’s criticism. Badawi wrote that her colleague extended an offer, presumably by way of Abdoun, to provide employment for a family member if she complied. She refused and concluded her Facebook post by writing: “Abdoun has destroyed the education sector.”

The following day, the Hadramout authorities’ military intelligence arrested Badawi. “Guys I’m with the intelligence services help me they confiscated by bag and my phones - Let everyone know - Hala Fuad Badawi”, Badawi wrote in a Facebook post on December 30.

Three days later, the governor of Hadramout issued an announcement accusing Badawi of spying for an unnamed foreign state. Shortly thereafter the government-owned Mukalla Radio station—whose owner Badawi had previously criticized—ran a segment relaying 12 accusations from an anonymous security source against Badawi, including bringing mines and IEDs into Hadramout and recruiting for a local terrorist cell. The broadcast also played what it said were intimate conversations between the journalist and governmental officials in Hadramout and other governorates.

Badawi was released from detention in mid-2022 but her work contract with the local governmental media office was cancelled. She no longer publishes on her Facebook page. However, there was a positive development in her case in December 2022, when the Primary Criminal Court in Hadramout dropped all charges against Badawi, according to her defense lawyer.
Section Five:
Other Human Rights Violations

Death, detention, and judicial persecution are the most highly publicized dangers faced by journalists in Yemen. However, a host of less severe violations suppress press activity in the country, including journalists being assaulted in the course of their reporting, being subject to threats and incitement campaigns, and conflict actors shuttering and commandeering media outlets.

As the graph below shows, both physical assaults and threats/incitement peaked in 2015 at the start of the war. These violations’ numbers have declined since 2015 although with some year-to-year variation in line with overall conflict trends (see Section Two). Year-to-year YJS data on shuttering and commandeering media outlets was unavailable.

Physical Assaults and Threats/Incitement Against Journalists, 2015-2022

Source: Yemeni Journalists’ Syndicate annual reports 2015-2022. Note: YJS includes various sub-categories of attack in the “assaults” section of its annual reports, often with considerable variation in sub-categories from year to year. In order to arrive at the figures displayed here as “physical assaults,” DT Institute counted only those attacks classified as “assaults on journalists” and “beatings,” while discounting all other sub-categories such as “assaults on media stations” and “assaults on journalists’ property.”

Physical Assault

YJS documented 13 cases of physical assaults against journalists in 2022, and 88 cases total since 2015. YJS includes various sub-categories of attack in the “assaults” section of its annual reports, often with considerable variation in sub-categories from year to year. In order to arrive at the figure of 88 assaults since 2015, DT Institute counted only those attacks classified as “assaults on journalists” and “beatings,” (i.e., physical attacks on the person) while discounting all other sub-categories such as “assaults on media stations” and “assaults on journalists’ property.”

As with other violation types examined in this report, actors affiliated with all local conflict parties have been implicated in physical assaults on journalists.
The Case of Abeer Abdullah and Colleagues: Attacked by Security Forces

Abeer Abdullah is a journalist in Taizz city, which is under control of RoYG and besieged by Houthi forces. Abeer and two colleagues were attacked by militants in June 2022 as they were working on a report for an international outlet on the housing shortage in Taizz. The three colleagues visited an area on the front lines and began filming when they were confronted by armed men, said Abdullah.

“[They said] it’s not OK for us to be filming on the front lines,” Abdullah told DT Institute. The militants belonged to “religious extremist groups” that oppose women mixing with men, working in public, and not wearing ultra-conservative dress, said Abdullah, adding that her presence in the film crew likely upset them. In addition, “Yemeni society, particularly the poor, in light of the war, think that journalists...own NGOs, and we film people in order to make money...they thought we were an NGO and we needed to pay up.”

“Some area residents took our side, others took the militants’ side, and words, insults, and blows were exchanged,” Abdullah continued. The militants told Abdullah “that if we kept filming, they would kill us. That we’re going to leave the area as corpses...They shot at us—they were ready to injure us, they didn’t care. God was merciful and we weren’t hit, but we were forced to leave the area,” Abdullah said.

Abdullah identified two of her assailants as members of the security services. She gave a statement about the incident to local security forces, leading a Taizz-based court to order the assailants’ arrest. As of mid-November 2022, there has been no progress on this case. Instead, security services in the area where the assault occurred, recently contacted Abdullah and asked her to drop the case.

Two recent incidents of assault targeted journalists from the same channel, Belqees TV. In March, 2022, three Belqees journalists were attacked by militants in Mareb city while filming a segment on development in times of war. “While filming, three people in civilian clothing stopped us and demanded our IDs and permit. We gave it to them and asked who they were,” one of the journalists, Khalil Taweel, told SEMC. “Immediately thereafter they attacked us and tried to confiscate our equipment, at which point a number of citizens in the area intervened and we took them to the police—who released [the attackers] without an interrogation or taking any measure against them.” In June 2022, Belqees journalist Abu Baker Hussein reportedly was beaten by government security forces in Shabwa as he was covering a local protest.

Threats and Incitement

Issuing threats and pursuing campaigns of incitement to silence journalists is common practice in Yemen’s war. YJS has documented 170 such incidents from 2015 through 2022, with all local conflict parties implicated in this misbehavior. While journalists worldwide are subject to threats, in Yemen threats are commonly paired with mistreatment or violent action.

The head of YJS’ Aden branch Mahmoud Thabet has been subject to a yearslong campaign of threats and incitement due to friction with forces affiliated with the ruling STC. Most recently, the website Wusta Online published an article on October 10, 2022 accusing Thabet of supplying the Houthis with information on newspapers, websites, and journalists in southern Yemen, and of “exploiting his leadership position in the syndicate’s Aden
branch for personal, material gain.” The article called for “a strict response [against Thabet] from all journalists and the families of martyrs who sacrificed their lives to defend against the Houthi invasion of Aden.”

Thabet told DT Institute that the website’s claims are “extremely inaccurate” and stem from a survey undertaken by YJS’ Aden branch regarding the number of journalists working in Aden at the behest of the International Federation of Journalists, of which YJS is a member. “This is one of the latest incitements and accusations directed against us that threaten our life,” said Thabet, remarking on the Wusta Online article. The article was published less than two weeks after STC militants stormed YJS’ Aden office, where Thabet works, only to withdraw later than day following the syndicate’s appeals to Aden’s governor.

Threats against journalists in Yemen need not originate from conflict parties per se—sometimes they arise from influential individuals upset by unfavorable reporting. In one notable incident this year, journalist Ali Awida told SEMC that he received information about threats against his life from powerful personalities in Mareb’s oil and gas sector, following his reporting on corruption and favoritism in that industry.

In August 2021 a military official in Hadramout posted the pictures of three journalists to a Facebook group with more than 34,000 members, calling for their killing. “A single bullet is worth more than a mercenary who betrays his country,” read the official’s message. The three journalists had fled Yemen in 2015 in order to avoid being kidnapped by al-Qaida, and had been writing on social media about corruption in Hadramout province. Prior to the military official issuing his threatening message, officials in Hadramout had issued an arrest warrant for the three journalists, accusing them of “undermining security.”

**Shuttering and Commandeering Outlets**

Since the start of the Yemeni conflict wartime actors have employed a variety of strategies to limit access to news and commentary deemed unfavorable or hostile, including shuttering or commandeering outlets and blocking websites.

The Houthi takeover of Sana’a in late 2014 was followed by a wave of shuttering of outlets deemed unfavorable to the group. “The Ministry of Information emphasizes that it will take strict and preventative legal measures, including shuttering, for any outlet that works to spread disunity and unrest,” the Houthi Ministry of Information announced in March 2015, and authorities made good on that threat. From January to June 2015 alone, the Ansar Allah movement closed 16 newspapers, 9 TV stations, and blocked 33 websites.

The deputy editor of one outlet that was raided in March 2015, al-Masdar Online, told SAM Organization for Rights and Liberties that Houthi militants confiscated all the equipment inside the outlet’s office building including cameras, furniture, and documents, totaling $100,000 in losses. Forces affiliated with the Houthis and former president Saleh also blocked the al-Masdar Online website and commenced an incitement campaign against the newspaper’s staff, accusing them of being “mercenaries and agents,” which forced them to flee the capital Sana’a for their safety.

“Every party or power that controls a specific piece of territory cancels any independent, or opposition journalistic activity or media outlet, which has led to the shuttering of roughly 80 newspapers, journals, and radio stations since the war began, to say nothing of blocking more than 200 local and foreign news websites from viewers in Yemen.”

– YJS 2021 annual report
Saba: Case Study in Commandeering Media Outlets

News agency Saba was among four government-owned outlets raided by the Houthis in the aftermath of their takeover of Sana’a. The Houthis commandeered Saba’s website and began to publish pro-Houthi content and propaganda, prompting Saba’s staff to open a new website. As of mid-November 2022, Saba. ye continues to publish content for the Ansar Allah movement’s audience, while Sabanew.net does the same for the internationally backed government’s audience.

After relocating to al-Mahra and then to Aden, Saba saw its offices attacked in July 2019, then raided and occupied in June 2021, in both instances by forces loyal to the ruling STC. During the latter incident, local STC official Mukhtar al-Yafi’a reportedly told the outlet’s employees that he had orders from the STC chief Aidrus al-Zubaydi to commandeer the outlet and turn it into the “Aden News Agency for the Southern Arab State.” Mahmoud Thabet, head of Saba’s Aden office, told DT Institute that employees and journalists have not been able to return to their offices to work since it was occupied in June 2021.

In the ensuing years the Houthis have continued to raid and shut down channels deemed insufficiently aligned with the group. Most recently, Houthi authorities raided nine radio stations in the first half of 2022, forcing them to temporarily suspend their broadcasts.

Forces affiliated with the Yemeni government have also repeatedly engaged in this type of press violation over the course of the conflict. In one incident, government-affiliated forces raided and shut down al-Jazeera’s office in Taizz city in early 2018, on orders from the governmental High Security Council in the province. An announcement from the council explained that “closing down the al-Jazeera office in Taizz occurred because of its coverage that reflects negatively on the course of the national army and legitimate government’s battle [with the Houthis].”

The STC as well has systematically raided and shut down outlets affiliated with the government as part of its power struggle with government actors for control over Aden. In one 2018 incident, militants wearing “Security Belt” uniforms stormed the office of the al-Shomou foundation—reportedly affiliated with former vice-president Ali Mohsin al-Ahmar—that was used to print the al-Shomou and Akhbar al-Youm papers. Militants shepherded workers out at gunpoint before setting the office ablaze, abducting seven employees in the process. In 2019, militants commandeered the government-affiliated October 14 paper and turned it into a pro-STC outlet, reportedly prompting the government to stop paying the paper’s operating expenses.
Conclusion: Looking Forward

This analytical report paints a bleak picture for the future of media freedoms in Yemen. Since the beginning of the conflict, local actors have treated media workers more like participants in the war than civilians performing an essential public function and have subjected them to a host of abuses. The factors that have contributed to a hostile media environment are all still present as 2022 comes to a close. These include the absence of the rule of law, the politicization of the media, and the proliferation of armed militias that have carved out de facto mini-states for themselves.

Nevertheless, a number of journalists inside Yemen continue to produce valuable reporting. Some rely on secrecy to do so, such as writing under a pseudonym and concealing their identity while traveling. Others are openly partisan, parroting the viewpoints of the authorities in control of the areas they operate in and using the protection afforded by their loyalty to report on corruption and malfeasance. In all cases, discretion is essential. “Sometimes when I’m inside Aden, I avoid writing about certain dangerous issues for my own personal safety as a journalist,” said Bassam al-Qadi, an investigative journalist who recently broke the story of leaking tanker ships—belonging to one of Yemen’s most powerful businessmen—poisoning the coast of Aden with a steady drip of oil and bilge. “But I don’t stop talking about [the issue]. When I’m able, I’ll talk about this corruption via other means.”

Perhaps the defining feature of journalists still working in the country is their bravery. Given the dangers associated with reporting in Yemen, going into the street with a camera or recorder requires accepting a high level of risk regardless of the topic. Indeed, several journalists who spoke to DT Institute said that facing the possibility of death was simply a part of the job. The courage of those who continue to report on issues of public importance is a bright spot in an otherwise dismal media freedom landscape. It suggests that the potential for a robust, professional media corps serving the wider public exists in Yemen. But this corps will only have the opportunity to thrive if all of the parties to the conflict let up on their sustained repression of journalists as part and parcel of their wartime strategies.

In the meantime, journalists’ work will remain essential to complement efforts by local and international organizations to document and draw international attention to daily abuses and violations in the ongoing Yemeni conflict. The impunity enjoyed by violators of media freedoms during the war only underscores the need to double down on a coordinated push aimed at protecting journalists’ rights and publicizing human rights violations being perpetrated against them. Many of the needed efforts will undoubtedly require a sustained engagement and consensus across a broad spectrum of international and domestic actors; there are some that are likely to yield immediate results at a minimal cost. These include:

- **Launching in-depth investigations into human rights violations against journalists with an eye towards spinning into action available international human rights enforcement and accountability mechanisms.** The violations highlighted in this analytical report have gone unpunished, and journalists who spoke to DT Institute expressed little hope that perpetrators will be brought to justice. In light of this, successful prosecution of even one case could spearhead momentum towards justice and accountability efforts for violations against media freedoms in Yemen. To this end, it is essential to expand the collection of evidence from traditional and open sources aimed at corroborating the statements offered by journalists who have been victims of human rights violations, followed by producing comprehensive compilations of evidentiary records and exploring the available international justice avenues for seeking action towards punishing the perpetrators. These activities also create an ideal opportunity for strengthening the Yemeni human rights defenders’ capacity to carry out high-quality investigations, and to make their voices heard as they engage in legal action and advocacy at the top international levels.
• **Conducting targeted advocacy campaigns on behalf of detained journalists in RoYG-controlled areas.** One recent case profiled in this report offers hope that advocacy efforts on behalf of detained journalists can generate concrete results. In a rare instance of a Yemeni journalist being publicly cleared of trumped-up charges, the Primary Criminal Court in Hadramout dropped all charges against journalist Hala Badawi December 2022. This followed nearly a year-long sustained advocacy action by various Hadrami, Yemeni, and international organizations on Badawi’s behalf. Badawi’s case suggests that certain actors affiliated with the RoYG might be willing to back down from their suppression of journalists when faced with persistent public pressure. Given the rising share of media freedom violations attributed to RoYG and STC actors since 2018 and the fact that Houthi violations against the media already receive widespread and much-needed publicity, future advocacy efforts could focus on specific detained journalists’ cases in RoYG and STC-controlled parts of Yemen. Investigative and documentation efforts led by the Yemeni human rights defenders could help identify priority cases based on the severity of the violation and the analysis of which actors might be most susceptible to public pressure generated from advocacy campaigns.

• **Creating and disseminating reference materials on Yemeni laws related to journalism and media.** One theme that emerged during a September 2022 media freedom conference organized by SEMC was the fact that many Yemeni journalists are unfamiliar with local laws related to their profession, including the guarantees and protections that should be afforded to them in carrying out their work. This lack of legal awareness can facilitate the conflict actors’ abuse of local laws to detain journalists for their activity, for example under charges of insulting a public official through their coverage. As such, simple handout materials that spell out, in plain, easy-to-understand terms, the vulnerabilities and protections related to journalism in Yemeni law would equip journalists with knowledge to avoid mistakes that could land them in jail, as well as instruct them as to the legal avenues available for redress should a violation occur. Widespread dissemination of such handouts across the journalist community could also be paired with relevant thematic trainings aimed at imparting journalists with knowledge and skills to protect themselves from persecution and other violations. Building the journalists’ capacity to understand and work within the framework of regional and international law would boost resiliency and sustainability of their reporting efforts.

• **Supporting Yemeni civil society organizations that help journalist victims of violations.** Journalists under threat in Yemen are often in need of emergency assistance, including legal aid as they navigate complex court cases, financial assistance to escape danger, and psychological support in the aftermath of a violent or traumatic incident. It is essential to expand support to local organizations that provide these essential services – such as YHRFL partner SEMC’s Marsadak program that offers legal, psychological, and financial support to journalists who have suffered violations of their human rights. Ensuring the continuity of such services will provide Yemeni journalists with a trusted outlet to turn to for help when they run into problems with local authorities and adverse interest groups.

At a minimum, the above actions would signal to the courageous Yemeni journalists that the international community is aware of their plight and is committed to breaking up the circle of impunity, serving as the encouragement needed to empower them to persevere with their vital societal role despite any risks.
Appendix A: 
Background on YJS and their Data

The Yemeni Journalists’ Syndicate (YJS) is a voluntary, professional organization established in 1976 that advocates on behalf of Yemeni journalists and freedom of expression in the country. YJS is the Yemen affiliate of the International Federation of Journalists, the organization that speaks for journalists within the UN system and international trade union movement, as well as member of the Federation of Arab Journalists.

In addition to releasing ad hoc press statements condemning violations against individual journalists, YJS publishes annual reports on the sum total of violations that year against journalists and media workers including reporters, photographers, freelancers, editors, and various staff working for the media (e.g., newspaper distributors, building guards). Yemeni civil society organizations, local and regional news outlets, and international human rights groups routinely cover these annual reports as bellwethers of press freedom in Yemen.

YJS Methodology

“For all cases, we must receive a written and clear complaint” laying out the circumstances of the violation, explained Nabeel al-Saidi, head of YJS’ training committee. This complaint comes from the journalist who has experienced a violation, or from their relatives, friends, or the media organization that they work with (e.g., in case of arrest or killing). After receiving a complaint YJS investigates the case using various methods depending on the case, which can include desk research, and/or contacting sources with relevant information, such as the journalist’s lawyer or security forces accused of the violation, said al-Saidi.

YJS’ main criteria for including a violation in its reports and announcements is that the incident is connected to the individual's work as a journalist. On the other hand, a dispute between neighbors where one party happens to be a journalist, or an armed group harassing a journalist because they want his car, our house, would not qualify, said al-Saidi. He estimated that about 10% of cases that reach YJS are not documented because the problem was determined to have resulted from a reason other than the complainant’s journalistic activity. In addition, a small number of YJS cases are quickly resolved with calls to security services or authorities and never documented at all.

Why Use YJS Data?

- Because it presents a holistic picture of the full range of violations journalists face in Yemen. The highest-profile attacks on journalists include death sentences, car bombs, airstrikes, etc. But there are a host of smaller violations quietly strangling press freedom in the country that YJS documents as well, including threats and incitement, assault, legal persecution, kidnapping and detention, torture, confiscation of equipment, blocking access to news websites, etc.

- Because it is based on reports on violations made directly by the victim or those closest to them (family and/or colleagues), which is followed by a checking process carried out by YJS, rather than news or social media reports.

- Because the syndicate has a reputation for professionalism.
Caveats and Limitations

DT Institute obtained YJS annual reports for years 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2021, and 2022 from the YJS website https://www.yemenjs.net/, and communicated directly with YJS to obtain annual reports for years 2019 and 2020, which were unavailable online.

YJS data contains several limitations. First of all, violation categories are often named inconsistently, and contain inconsistent sub-categories from one annual report to the next. In addition, certain violation subsections appear in one annual report only to disappear in the next, or they are subsumed under a different violation category. To address these inconsistencies, DT Institute has only displayed year-to-year data for those violation categories which were so similar year to year as to render inconsistencies trivial across the annual reports. These include detentions, killings, and threats and incitement. As for assaults, YJS includes various sub-categories of attack in the “assaults” section of its annual reports, often with considerable variation in sub-categories from year to year. In order to arrive at the figures displayed in the “Physical Assaults” section of this report, DT Institute counted only those attacks classified as “assaults on journalists” and “beatings,” while discounting all other sub-categories such as “assaults on media stations” and “assaults on journalists’ property.”

Notably, inconsistencies in the names and subcategories of various violation types do not impact an analysis of overall violations year-to-year, because all violations—regardless of their name and the category they are subsumed under—are included under the overall violations rubric. Therefore, DT Institute has also analyzed and displayed YJS’ year-to-year data on overall press violations in this report.

In addition, there is inconsistency in how YJS counts a given violation as a single incident, versus multiple incidents. Some violations involving multiple victims are counted as a single incident; other violations with multiple victims are counted as multiple incidents, once per victim. DT Institute has addressed this inconsistency by treating rising or falling violation numbers as rough indications of conflict trends to be confirmed or discounted by other data.

Criticisms of YJS

It is important to note that YJS has received criticism from Yemeni journalists on two main points. These criticisms include:

- YJS is ineffective at advocating for journalists’ rights inside the country. DT Institute makes no comment on this criticism aside to note that it does not bear on the syndicate’s documentation efforts and therefore is not relevant to the data presented in this report.

- YJS is biased in favor of journalists from northern Yemen and the Islah party, at the expense of journalists from southern Yemen; this leads the syndicate to issue harshly worded announcements regarding violations committed by the STC, versus rather tame announcements regarding violations committed by northern actors. However, the data in this report is pulled from YJS’ annual reports, rather from its ad hoc announcements on particular violations, meaning that this criticism does not apply to the data presented here. In addition, it is important to note that the STC is only listed as the perpetrator in 3.3% of the total violations that appear in YJS’ annual reports, as opposed to 21% for the government and 61% for the Houthis, tempering this criticism of bias against southern actors.
Appendix B: Major Actors Included in This Report

The three major Yemeni conflict parties that appear in this report (the Houthi movement, the internationally recognized government (GoY), and Southern Transitional Council (STC)) are not monoliths. Each entity includes various governmental offices, military forces, tribal blocs, and influential personalities. In a given violation instance, the perpetrator may have been acting of their own accord, or on behalf of a particular set of local or political interests, or in service of the wider actor’s cause with which the perpetrator is affiliated.

The Houthi movement: The Houthis are Zaydi Shiites who captured Sana’a in late 2014 and now control large parts of the country’s north and west. Initially allied with former president Ali Abdullah Saleh at the start of the conflict, the Houthis killed Saleh in 2017 after he shifted his support to the SLC.

The internationally-recognized Republic of Yemen government (RoYG): Led by former president Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi from 2012 until April 2022, the GoY is now represented by an eight-member presidential council led by Rashad al-Alimi. The GoY’s nominal capital is Aden but that southern city is under de facto control of the STC; the GoY’s last remaining bastion in northern Yemen is oil-rich Mareb.

The Southern Transitional Council (STC): Formed in May 2017 and headed by Aidarus al-Zubaydi, the STC is an outgrowth of Yemen’s southern separatist movement. The STC was incorporated into the GoY in the 2019 Riyadh agreement and has representatives on Yemen’s newly formed presidential council; however, it is treated in this report as a separate actor because it regularly clashes with GoY forces and pursues its own agenda. The STC is backed by the United Arab Emirates.

The Saudi-led Coalition (SLC): A coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states formed in 2015 that has carried out an air campaign against the Houthis in support of the internationally-backed government.
End Notes


8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 3, 9; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 9
10 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 10, 11; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14
11 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 7; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 26
12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 6; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 16
13 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 17
14 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19; A/HRC/14/23, paras. 29 and 105
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 8(2)(a)(i), (2)(b)(i), (2)(c)(i) and (2)(e)(i); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 130; Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War 1949, art. 147; Additional Protocol I, art. 85.
19 Ibid.
20 A/HRC/20/22, para. 67; Final Report to the Prosecutor by Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, June 13, 2000
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
29 “Yemeni Media: Bleeding Lives and Truth,” Marsadak/Media Freedom Observatory - Yemen, May, 2022, https://economicmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%80-2021%D9%80%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86.pdf; “Yemeni Journalists: 3 Years of Homelessness and Displacement,” Studies and Economic Media Center, May, 2018, https://economicmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Yemeni-Journalist-mapping-Arabic.pdf
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
Findings on Human Rights Violations against Journalists in Yemen | DT Institute

57 Ibid.
60 Yemeni Media: Bleeding Lives and Truth,” Marsadak/Media Freedom Observatory - Yemen, May, 2022, https://economicmedia.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%B9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%B9%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8B-%D9%80-2021%D9%A8%D9%84%D9%85%D9%86-%D9%86.pdf
63 Nabiha AlHidary, Facebook, June 24, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/nabiha.alhidary.7/posts/pfbid0RUSAKj5coJQuhWUXKFE4mQRqWMEUIFdnjmb9WWQHaxR6BuggzhrMvli8ePJJY9kU
67 The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate Documents 50 Violations of Press Freedom During the First Half of the Current Year,” Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, July 7, 2022, https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-
%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%81%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a9/
68 “The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate Documents 50 Violations of Press Freedom During the First Half of the Current Year,” Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, July 7, 2022, https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d8%a7%d9%81%d8%a9-%d9%81%d9%8a-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%a9/
69 “A Houthi responsible for the detention file is accused of “torturing journalists,” al-Sharq al-Awsat, December 6, 2022,

75 Nabeel AloSaidi, Facebook, September 7, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/aloasaidi/posts/pfbid02U0cUEuLkY1FhBbPQfKxN1dGqUbcu7qPF0y2aC3KpV6PcQFXVzqc5ARTGraA7TSVI

76 “The Journalist Ahmed Maher Directs a Message from Jail: Everything that I’m Accused of is False and I’m Imprisoned Unjustly and I Demand an Investigation According to the Law,” al-Masdar Online, October 18, 2022, https://almasdaronline.com/articles/261877

77 Nabeel AloSaidi, Facebook, September 7, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/aloasaidi/posts/pfbid02U0cUEuLkY1FhBbPQfKxN1dGqUbcu7qPF0y2aC3KpV6PcQFXVzqc5ARTGraA7TSVI


79 “The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate Condemns the Trial of the Two Colleagues Bin Makhashin and Kashmim Before a non-Specialized Court,” Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, December 9, 2021, https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a7%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%85%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%83%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7/

80 Hala Fuad, Facebook, December 23, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/hala_fuad.35/posts/pfbid0Ouj9gNpj6RK6pibS4ZM1VSYZD52Wc8TTPQlHF8W9rL7Kyc7HMtdmYLLbAv9Uzcel

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid.

83 Hala Fuad, Facebook, December 30, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/hala_fuad.35/posts/pfbid02Zw6jZrpL9P5aaxjZLWbEnmy34DUmxbu2bZdvbr4a9m7ZwQaSakoyAwMqr4jNjQ1


86 Ibid.

87 Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, Facebook, May 17, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02C7nrKtTW4qc4q6eYyVAm8UYggfBQLVHE3TIDWPLsmGM4D2HePkwewbFBeJKqAvId=542893015862687

88 “The Primary Criminal Court rules that the journalist Hala Badawi is innocent,” December 7, 2022, https://alraseefpress.net


90 Ibid.

91 “The Journalists Syndicate Condemns the Assault on Belqees Channel’s Correspondent in Shabwa,” Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, June 9, 2022, https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a7%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d9%84%d8%a8%d9%85%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b7-%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%83%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7/

92 Ibid.

93 Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, Facebook, November 21, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid094LyPDhRfm6sBG7DQhVsJPA5k2boWweLRHeCBzgj85fuhz7rTznP6TKYkh79jrai%248293015862687&_rdr

94 Ibid.

95 Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, Facebook, September 30, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0Z3MujN7kUM8Whak6gbpRTD7htNkYyHNQLZMGUoQXirzA273Lb7VqH4an2KTsId=100064879022605


98 Ibid.

99 Ibid.


101 “The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate Releases its Annual Report and Documents 104 Violations Against Press Freedoms in 2021,” Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, March 9, 2022, https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%83%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7/


103 Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, Facebook, September 30, 2022, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid02ZMujN7kUM8Whak6gbpRTD7htNkYyHNQLZMGUoQXirzA273Lb7VqH4an2KTsId=100064879022605

104 Ibid.


106 “The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate Releases its Annual Report and Documents 104 Violations Against Press Freedoms in 2021,” Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, March 9, 2022, https://www.yemenjs.net/%d9%86%d9%82%d8%a7%d8%a8%d8%a9-%d8%a7%d9%84%d8%b5%d8%ad%d9%81%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%a8%d9%85%d8%a7%d9%83%d9%85%d8%a9-%d8%a7/
%d8%a7%d9%84%d9%8a%d9%85%d9%86%d9%8a%d9%86-%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b7%d9%84%d9%82-
%d8%aa%d9%82%d8%b1%d9%8a%d8%b7%d9%87%d8%a7-2/
105 Ibid.
106 Abdo Ayesh, “The Houthis Block al-Jazeera Net in Yemen as Part of a Campaign Against the Media,” al-Jazeera, April 8, 2015, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2015/4/8/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%88%D8%AB%D9%8A%D9%88%D9%86-%D9%8A%D8%AD%D8%A8%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D9%86%D8%AA-%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%B6%D9%85%D9%86
109 "Al-Jazeera Laments the Closing of its Office in Taizz,” al-Jazeera, January 10, 2018, https://www.aljazeera.net/news/arabic/2018/1/10/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AC%D8%B2%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D9%81-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2
111 Ibid.
112 Yemeni Journalists Syndicate, Facebook, June 8, 2021, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=pfbid0pwxN1SoVRTp6Ew1QAcF3wRiARAAST7BWe9Pthf31A4MkDMGv2dgzTbcZnAPSpHCpZl&id=542893015862687 ; Zakaria al-Kamali, “The Southern Transitional Council take the Houthis’ Approach to Media,” al-Arabi al-Jadeed, June 13, 2021, https://www.alaraby.co.uk/entertainment_media%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%AC%D9%84%D8%B3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%AA%D9%82%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%A3%D9%81-%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%82-%D9%85%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A8%D9%87%D8%A7-%D9%81%D9%8A-%D8%AA%D8%B9%D8%B2
113 Ibid.